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in most developed countries have
been forced to recognize since the mid-Twentieth Century that they are a
minority group. Their statistical position had been clear at least a
generation earlier but in economic, social, and certainly in political
dimensions, statistics did not tell the full story. Recognition of the
minority status of farming has been variously resisted, and has forced
itself upon industrialized countries at critical moments in their
histories, going far back into the Nineteenth Century in the case of
England and several smaller countries (Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg).
In the United States, farming, forestry and fishing employed half the
labor force as late as 1880, and it was 1920 before employed workers in
manufacturing and the building trades outnumbered those in agriculture.
The percentage of the U.S. population employed in agriculture in 1940
was approximately the same as it had been in Great Britain one hundred
years earlier (22.7 per cent, in 1841).&’
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Acceptance of minority status has been much easier for farmers
in densely settled countries dependent upon imports for a major share
of their food supply. The strategic value of a domestic food supply
in wartime guaranteed economic support for Twentieth Century agriculture
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland far beyond any attention
their farmers could command by weight of numbers or voting strength.
And minority status in a political and social sense has been moderated
by a knowledge that they were at-l essential element in national survival
through two World Wars.
The situation in the United States is sharply different. Here the
implications of minority status have been forced to the attention of
a farm population that not only maintained the position of the United
States as a net agricultural exporter, but increased it after the farm
labor force had fallen below five per cent of the gainfully employed.
The United States is the first major food exporting country to face the
adaptations required of a nation in which farmers are no longer a major
political force.
This is a necessary prelude to an understanding of many of the
economic, social and political forces that will shape U. S. agriculture
in the years ahead. In examining these forces in this Seminar, it is
important to remember that my crystal ball is no clearer than yours.
The points I will make are advanced with much uncertainty. I will raise
more questions that I can answer. They will be designed to stimulate
discussion, and to provide an outline that can focus that discussion on
at least some of the critical issues.3
I propose to look first at some elements of change that have
direct effects on the farming business. In terms of both immediate
impacts and long run implications, the most insistent issue concerns
the question of energy.
We practice “cheap fuel” farming in the United States, and have
done so throughout our history of agricultural mechanization. This is
a reflection of our resource endowment, and the geographic accident
that has located petroleum supplies in proximity to major farming
regions. It is also a reflection of our institutional structure,
and especially our tax system.
To the extent that state and federal taxes have raised the price
of non-farm motor fuels there has been some price-induced restraint in
their use. This restraint is lacking for fuels used in farming.
Most of our states have constitutional or legislative prohibitions
on the use of motor vehicle taxes for any purpose other than highway
building, policing, and maintenance. This applies especially to taxes
on motor fuels. One consequence has been to inhibit any taxation of
motor fuels used in farming. To do so would raise serious questions
about the propriety of taxing farm fuels for general revenue purposes,
while motor fuels used in highway travel are taxed only for highway
purposes. As a result, farm fuels go untaxed.
The dedication of all highway fuel taxes to highway purposes has
thus worked to insulate farm fuels from any cost increases reflecting
higher rates of taxation. The cost ratio of farm fuels to non-farm
motor fuels has fallen steadily over the past half century, reflecting
the rise in highway motor fuel taxes. The decline was especially marked
after the introduction of federal taxes to finance the interstate
highway program in 1956.
For example, from 1940 to 1960 the composite average state and
federal gasoline tax doubled, from approximately .051 to .104 per
‘~ This had no effect upon the price of farm fuels, except gallon.
~/ Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, p. 554. .—4
to make them cheaper relative to non-farm fuels.
Farm fuels have not only been cheap relative to non-farm motor
fuels, but their relative share in farm production costs has been falling.
This has undoubtedly influenced farmer decisions regarding mechanization,
the number of motors used, size of motors, and intensity of use.
Total expenditures on farm fuels have also declined as a fraction
of total cash farm operating expenses, and especially so in recent years.
Cash outlays on gas, oil, and grease in the Southeast Farm Management
Association farms in Minnesota, for example, were 7.4 percent of total
cash operating expense in 1960, 6.2 per cent in 1965 and 4.7 per cent
in 1972. In the 6outhwest Association, the comparable percentages were
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4.5 in 1960, 4.4 in 1965 and 2.7 in 1972.–
For many farms, fuel has become a minor cost item. Its decline
in relative cost outlay has fostered a cheap fuel image. We have as
a result an agricultural production structure that is based on the
relatively lavish use of fuel, and in which cash outlays for fuel have
been overwhelmed by the rapid expansionin other cash farm operating
expenses.
United States agriculture is thus ill-equipped to face petroleum
fuel shortages. Because farm fuel prices have not included the substan-
tial taxes dedicated to highway expenditures, any increase in basic fuel
costs will have a larger percentage impact on farmers than on highway
users. It seems probable that the half-century decline in the relative
cost of petroleum fuels in agriculture will be reversed.
If this occurs, we can expect a continuing farm fuel problem, and
especiallyin the political arena. Price rises in fuel costs will be
painful, but relative farm outlays for fuel are not large enough to
insure that price increases will achieve economy in fuel use. If farm
fuel prices had been doubled in Southern Minnesota in 1972, for example,
fuel expenditures would still have been only about 7 per cent of total
cash farm operating expenses.
—
Y Annual Reports, Southeast and Southwest Farm Management Associations,
1960-1972, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University
of Minnesota. The lower percentages in the Southwest are due to the
larger role played by feeder cattle purchases in total farm operating
expenses in that region.5
This suggests that price policy alone may be inadequate to deal with
a shortage of petroleum fuels for farming. It must be reckoned a possi-
bility that widespread fuel rationing for agriculture may be needed in
the years immediately ahead.
This is the short-run prospect. The longer run agricultural pros-
pect raises issues that go to the heart of the world wide energy problem.
There are farmers alive and farming today who have witnessed in their
lifetimes the conversion of agriculture from an activity based on a
flow of solar energy converted through crops and animals to one based
on a stock of fossil fuels. This is true both for energy used for
motive power and energy in the form of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals.
We have an agricultural production plant that is almost wholly dependent
on an exhaustible resource.
This may only be a transitional phenomenon. Although world wide
stocks of fossil fuels are large and many more may be discovered, the
international movement of these fuels raises problems of national
dependence on trade, balance of payments, and monetary policy that are
new in history. In the past, some nations could fear for their food
supplies in time of war or blockade. But even England in the darkest
days of the Second World War could reckon on her coal for a basic energy
supply that could sustain her.
It is a different world today. Every major industrial nation imports
some of its petroleum fuels. The Soviet Union, with vast and untapped
resources, imports petroleum products from Iran. Recognition of the
consequences of this form of fuel dependency has been unavoidable in
oilpoor nations like Japan, Italy, the two Germanies, and France. It has
come suddenly to the United States, and the shock has been great. We do
not even have the statistics readily available to measure the degree of
this dependency, and its consequences for domestic and foreign policy.
One question emerges with unexpected importance. How long will it
remain economic for the United States to import petroleum for fuels and
fertilizers to produce wheat, cotton, feed grains and soybeans for export
in order to earn the money needed to pay for petroleum imports? How
durable, in other words, is our present comparative advantage in export
markets for farm products?6
At the moment this seems to be a ridiculous question. We can export
everything we have for sale and at prices undreamed of even twelve
months ago. But it is a question that must be asked. Potentials for the
improvement of agricultural productivity in the rest of the world are
great, and especially so in the Soviet Union. The foreign markets that
have generated the current euphoria in United States agriculture could
prove to be transitory. And if the problem of farm surpluses returns
it will be in a new dimension. The conservation of energy supplies will
be an added and insistent consideration in any future farm programs that
seek to manage farm output.
If a management problem of this type arises, it will be resolved
in a changed political climate. An agricultural production plant producing
export surpluses in competition with householders and motorists for energy
supplies will face political opposition of a new kind. Should this
occur, it seems probable that agriculture will be subjected to both input
and output control measures that will be much more demanding than any-
thing we have known in the past.
Programs of food aid to developing nations will undoubtedly feel a
major part of the force of any rise in the real cost of energy. It is
one thing to sell cheaply or to give away food surpluses produced with
domestic resources. It is quite a different matter if these food surpluses
must be produced with imported fuels and chemicals. That part of
the energy crises in the United States that involves petroleum will have
an especially heavy impact on international aid programs.
Cheap energy has also contributed to structural changes in agri-
culture that result in large and specialized farms. The impact of this
“ change is especially heavy in the feed-livestock sector, with consequences
for price and market policy that we are only beginning to perceive.
A major source of past imbalance in American agriculture has been
the long-standing differential between labor rewards in crop farming
and in livestock production. As long as mixed or diversified farming7
predominated, the farm family could increase family income by care of
livestock, although labor returns per hour were often quite low.
One consequence of expanding farm size is that the farm family
feels less compelled to include a livestock enterprise in order to
meet a target family income. If this income level can be achieved with
cash crops alone, there is little compulsion for the family to commit
labor to the demanding care of livestock.
This is especially true if the farm is very large and must depend
on a significant amount of hired labor. The livestock sector of family
farm agriculture is still less mechanized than the crop sector, and
the quality of labor required for successful livestock rearing is fre-
quently not available in the farm labor market.
The recent behavior of many family-type farmers in the Middle West
suggests that they do have a target family income in mind, at least in
the short run. Many farms that once included a substantial livestock
enterprise have now eliminated the livestock, and produce only cash
grain.
This trend has reduced both the number and the proportion of farmers
who find a given increase in the price of livestock products to be an
adequate incentive for increased output. In the past, a farmer growing
his own feed could follow the traditional calculations involved in the
hog-corn or beef-corn ratios in deciding whether to sell his grain or
feed it. These were open options, and he could expand or contract his
livestock operation relatively quickly.
For many corn growers today, this option is not available. They
have liquidated their hog or beef-feeding enterprises, have no adequate
equipment for livestock feeding, and have organized their family time
schedules around a cash grain operation with its less insistent daily
time commitment.
The price signals needed to secure a given production response
are no longer adequately measured by,the traditional hog-feed, dairy-
feed, or beef-feed price ratios. Imbedded in those traditional ratios
were assumed cost components that reflected underemployed family labor,8
an unmet family income target, and the existence of some unused production-
plant capacity in the form of farm buildings, equipment, water systems,
etc.
These assumptions no longer hold. A large cash grain farm can
meet the family income target. More opportunities are available for
the employment of farm women. Children remain in school to older ages,
go farther from home for schooling, and seek urban instead of farm
employment. There has been a change in farm life styles.
This is nowhere more evident than in the growth of off-farm employ-
ment for farmers. The average farm operator f%mily in 1972 received
half of its income from non-farm jobs or investments. For farms with
gross sales of $5,000 to $9,999, off farm income exceeded farm income
by 58 percent. In commercial farms with gross sales of $2,500 to $4,999,
off-farm income was over three times as large as farm income. The
majority of the farming population today does not look to farming for
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its major source of income.-
As a result, we may be witnessing a fundamental change in the
reaction of farmers to fluctuations in agricultural product prices.
Price changes may need to persist over longer periods of time before
they elicit a supply response. And when it comes, it may be more
massive than the same relative price change would have triggered
a generation earlier. Larger, more specialized farms involve heavy
capital commitments and elaborate organizational planning. It takes
time to set them in production. And once in production they will tend
to continue to produce at a given rate in spite of price changes that
would have resulted in expanaion or cut-backs in a population of
family-farm producers.
This is one aspect of scale of operation and degree of specializa-
tion that we have not studied adequately. In other fields of agricultural
&/ U. S. Census, 1970, “Income of the Farm Related Population”,
Series PC (2)-8c, Washington, D. C., U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
1973, and Farm Income Situation, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
FIS-222, July 1973.9
production where large-scale enterprises have predominated, there is
evidence to suggest that large scale firms do not alter production
schedules in response to price changes, except under sustained economic
pressure. This has been reported for rubber in Malaysia, sugar in the
5/ If production involves a mix of Caribbean and pineapple in Hawaii.-
large specialized farms and smaller diversified farms the effect is to
shift the short-run burden of output adjustment in response to price to
the diversified farms.
We may be entering this phase, in the evolution of U. S. agriculture.
Farm product prices have changed drastically in recent months, and
output response has been sluggish in the livestock sector. Many
reasons account for this lag in response, not least the wildly fluctuating
prices of feedstuffs which make long-range livestock production planning
highly uncertain. But it seems likely that one reason is that a basic
change has taken place in the structure of agriculture. The result is a
production pattern that could lengthen the supply response cyble in
livestock products, increase the amplitude of its movements, and result
in inwnobility in supply over relatively long time periods. The agri-
cultural output curve for livestock products, in short, may come to
resemble that of the steel industry.
This shift out of livestock has been building up over several decades.
With the exception of 1940 and 1946, we have been net importers of
meat for nearly 40 years. Domestic milk production is declining and we
may well be entering into a production phase in which we will be net
importers of dairy products, on an increasing scale.
We are beginning to exhibit the production characteristics of some
developing countries in which large land holdings and very small farms
exist ina symbibtic relationship. The big farms do not produce
livestock products because labor requirements, market risks and price
5_/C. R. Wharton, Jr,, “Marketing, Merchandising and Moneylending:
A Note on Middleman Monopsony in Malaya”. Malayan Economic Review,
Vol. VII, No. 2, October 1962, pp. 24-44; George Beckford, Per-
sistent Poverty, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1972.10
levels do not encourage it. Cash cropping is the rule on big farms.
The little farms are limited in their capacity to produce livestock
products because they are too small to support risk-taking and
management skills on the scale needed. As a result, livestock produc-
tion is stunted, and unresponsive to price. In the European version
of this relationship between scale of enterprise and output mix it has
been difficult to secure an increase in meat production, especially
beef, because the farms are so small. In the American version, we may
demonstrate the reverse proposition. It may become increasingly difficult
and expensive to gain increases in meat and milk output because our farms
are so large.
In a wider sense, this is the way world wide food shortages will
be reflected in domestic price levels and consumption patterns. Grain
can be stored and shipped long distances at low cost, The revolution
in ocean transport costs brought about by the giant oil tankers (which
can also carry grain) has cheapened the cost of grain imports for food
deficit areas. Grain prices have risen relative to livestock product
prices. The grain surplus of the past two decades held down market prices
and gave us cheap domestic livestock feed. This grain surplus is gone.
Domestic meat consumers must bid against world market grain prices for
the feed required to increase meat supplies. The world demand for more
grain is being converted into a restructuring of our domestic output mix
of agricultural products.
The argument can be summarized in this way:
Resource mobility within agriculture may be declining at the same
time that the mobility of resources from non-farm sectors into agriculture
is increasing. A more capital-intensive agricultural structure may
also be a more rigid one. If this occurs, one casualty will be our
conventional economic wisdom regarding the price elasticities of agri-
cultural output.11
One of the most persistent and visible trends in United States
..,,
agriculture has been the continuing increase, in size and decline in
number of farms since the Second World War. In crude terms, the
number of farms was cut in half from 1950 to 1973, and average size
of farms doubled. These data are defective in that changes in the
definition of a farm have taken place on several occasions since
1950. The 5,648,000 farms enumerated by the census in 1950, for
example, included a number of small farms in size classes that are
excluded in the estimate of 2,831,000 farms for 1973. Although the
degree of decline in number of farms is overstated, the magnitude of
the increase in average farm size is not significantly disturbed by
this correction,
As we have seen, a part of the explanation for this increase
can be traced to the relatively low cost of energy in agriculture
which has encouraged the substitution of machine power for human and
animal power. This trend has been accelerated by a continuous decline
in the cost of machinery and equipment relative to labor. And in
recent decades the trend has been heavily influenced by peculiarities
in the institutional structure affecting farm price support programs,
credit programs, and tax policies. TWO of these peculiarities merit
a closer examination.
Since price support programs have in the past been tied to crop
acreage or a production history, the size of any government payments
to individual farmers has had a direct and linear relation to volume
of production. Insharpontras~by underwriting a relative degree of
farm price stability, the federal government has had an influence on
the risk expectations of farms in different farm size classes that is
not linear. A historic limitation on large scale farming activities
has always been the indeterminant nature of large risks. In agricul-
ture these involve both market price risks and climatic and biologic
risks . By reducing substantially the risk of market price collapse,
the net effect of government farm price support programs has been to
make farm investments relatively more attractive to large scale investors12
than to small scale investors or family type farmers. Large scale
farmers have been encouraged to use venture capital more effectively
than is possible for small entrepreneurs. Capacity to make use of
\
financial “leverage” is in general unavailable to family type farmers.
This becomes increasingly important as size of farm expands, permitting
a given proportionate increase in equity capital to finance a much
larger increase in total business activity.
This in turn has been a consequence of the peculiar nature of
United States accounting practices and tax policy with respect to the
taxation of income, and particularly income from capital gains. Since
interest on borrowed capital is a business expense in computing income
tax liability, those enterprises with adequate borrowing power and
large incomes can shift from the use of equity capital to the use of
borrowed capital to advantage. The net effect is to reduce the cost of
capital to the large firm. This opportunity is either unavailable or of
minor significance for family type enterprises.
The resulting stimulus to the expansion of the farm business has
been given further impetus by our method of taxing capital gains. Up
to 1969 this tax was levied at a rate of never more than 25% of the
realized capital gain. Since tax liability on earned income can rise
to a height of 70% on incomes above $200,000, there has been a substan-
tial reward to high-income taxpayers for the conversion of earned income
into capital gain. Some reduction in this incentive was achieved by
the tax reform act of 1969, which provided for an increase in the capital
gains tax liability from 25% to 35% when income from capital gains exceeds
$50,000 in a tax year. This rate increase has been relatively small
compared to the reward that could be achieved by realizing income in the
form of capital gain, never to be taxed at more than 35%, while income
from wages and salaries could be taxed at rates up to 70%.
As a consequence, an incentive condition has been created for wealthy
investors or large firms to buy land on credit, and farm it while holding
it in anticipation both of income from annual operation and from ultimate
liquidation, through the differential savings made possible by the capital
gains tax structure.
The development of corporation and large scale farming in the last
20 years has been heavily influenced by these trends. They introduced
an element of institutional bias into a structure ofcost and returns13
based on conventional farm operating practices that has greatly accelerated
the trend toward larger farms. To put the matter in other terms, the farm
size structure that we have today is in part a consequence of expanding
technology, and economies of size resulting from the rising cost of labor
relative to the cost of capital. But this fails to tell the whole story.
A major part of the reason for the continuing expansion of farm size is
due to our institutional structure, and particularly to our tax system
and to the past twenty years of our farm price support programs.
The farm price support program has been changed but the tax inequity
remains. We tax income from property at never
in the form of capital gain. We put a penalty
and salaries that rises above the 25% marginal
$12,000 for a married tax payer filing a joing
more than 35% when realized
tax on income from wages
rate when income goes above
return. It rises above
the 35% marginal rate when family income goes above $24,000. Put in
other terms, for family taxable incomes above $12,000 our tax system
gives an increasing reward to income from property over income from
labor. This has insured that the operation of the land market will
transfer real property over time from the hands of those with low in-
comes to the hands of those with high incomes. This trend is clearly
under way in American agriculture today.
Another dimension of the problem is even more puzzling. It has
been a major article of rural faith in the past that the disappearance
of family farmers could be traced tolow farm prices and lack of ability
to command a reward in the market place that was commensurate with con-
tributions to national welfare. We have recently had farm prices at
or above parity levels in almost all farm commodities. It remains to
be seen whether this dramatic shift in farm price levels will be a
benefit or a disaster for family farmers. As noted above, one of the
inhibiting factors that has historically prevented large investors
from acquiring farm lands has been the combination of high market and
weather risks. A major reason for the durability of a family farm
structure is that it could survive catastrophe. It remains to be
seen whether or not it can survive prosperity. Under our existing
institutional structure, the prospects are that high and stable farm
prices will work to the disadvantage of family farmers by attracting14
an additional influx of non-farm capital that in the past was scared
away from farming by high risk.
Apart from incentives for farm size expansion based on our finan-
cial and institutional structure, what are the incentives for continued
expansionof the scale of farm businesses that are determined by tech-
nological and production considerations in agriculture? In answering
this question it is important to recognize that we have been led astray
by some of the language used in discussing this topic in the past.
There is a rhetorical tradition in the United States that leads us to
characterize large scale farms as “factories in the field”. Much of
the recent popuhar literature discussing trends in United States
agriculture has included forecasts and sometimes artists’ drawings
showing the farm of the future in a version that has been derived from
an idealized model of a factory. This imagery is doubly misleading.
One major advantage of a factory system is that it permits economies
of scale in the movement of raw material through successive processing
stages. The other major economic argument in favor of a large factory
is that it permits economies of scale in the supervision of labor.
For some types of agriculture these two controlling economies can be
achieved in large factory-type installations. The outstanding examples
relate to vegetable crops and poultry and beefcattle feeding enterprises.
Here it has been possible to bring together raw materials in a relatively
confined space and establish production systems that utilize biological
processes so designed that they resemble a production line structure
in a conventional factory. In the language of business economics a
“batch operation” has been converted into a “flow operation”. To the
extent that it will be possible to convert other types of agricultural
activity from batch or seasonal enterprises to continuous or flow
operations, we can expect a continuation of economic and technological
pressures for the enlargement of farm sizes.
The reverse of this proposition must also be examined critically.
To the extent that it is not possible to assemble agricultural raw
materials at one location and organize them in such a way that they
meet the test of a flow process, we can expect substantial diseconomies15
of scale to be associated with large scale farm enterprises. This is
still the case in those types of farm production processes that are based
on the conversion of solar energy through plant life. As long as chlorophyll
photosynthesis remains the cheapest available means of solar energy con-
version, it will be profitable to distribute our crop growing activities
over geographic space. In this circumstance, it will be difficult to
satisfy the twin conditions necessary for factory systems to prevail,
namely economies of size in transport and in labor supervision.
I do not rule out the possibility that we may see a continuing
development in automation that will permit field crop enterprises to be
converted from batch processes. to flow processes. This is achieved, for
example, in large scale hothouse operations where temperature, humidity
and water supply can be subjected to exact controls. For premium priced
fruits, flowers and vegetable crops this possibility is capable of
further expansion. Some new technology makes it even probably that cer-
tain classes of field crops may be grown under environmentally controlled
conditions in the future. At the present time, however, these prospects
do not seem tangible for field crop production on the scale necessary
to supply us with basic grain and forage inputs. If this is a correct
appraisal, then one consequence is that the trend toward large scale
farm enterprises for field crop production does not appear to be dictated
by technological considerations. If this trend continues, it will
almost certainly be due to institutional reasons, particularly those
relating to price, credit, and tax policy.
Another dimension, must be considered before this discussion can be
regarded as balanced. The social structure of farming is a prominent
part of the total picture. Throughout our history we have had a dis-
persed pattern of agricultural settlement , with family farmsteads dotting
the landscap@. With few exceptions we have never known the type of
village-based agriculture that predominates in so many parts of the
world. This era of dispersed settlement may well be coming to an end.
It is ironic that the region of the country which in popular mythology
has been regarded as most rigorously independent, namely the Great Plains,
is the region in which we may first see the emergence of something akin16
to the village agriculture of Europe or Asia.
The isolation involved in scattered farmsteads and ranches in the
Great Plains is now reaching proportions that render it pathologic in
a cultural sense. As a consequence, much of the Great Plains is being
depopulated in two dimensions. Population is declining over large areas,
and those who remain are clustering in villages and small cities. In
the European version of this phenomenon, it has been customary to point
out that the one-family farm is no longer a viable social institution
if the family values its leisure time at opportunity cost rates of
return. Young people, and particularly farm wives, are not satisffed
to be chained to livestock enterprises in a manner that was accepted by
their parents. As a result the agricultural price policies and planning
systems of several European countries, especially Sweden and the Nether-
lands, have established a “two family farm” as the modal enterprise which
their planning and price policies seek to support. The main reason for
setting the norm at two families was not technological but social. In
that way families could have some relief from the demanding work routine
required by intensive farming.
On the basis of present trends, it is unlikely that a two-family
farm model will prosper in the United States. Instead, the solution
that seems to be emerging is a form of village agriculture in which
the social defects of isolated one-family farms are being resolved by
regrouping farm families in urban places. The farms and ranches that
survive this economic and social change may remain in family hands but
they will not resemble traditional family farms, in that they may be
devoid of rural residences. It is perhaps no accident that this physical
concentration of rural residences is taking place in areas where the social
cost of distance generated traditions of fierce independence in a past
generation, and is associated today with the most pronounced pattern of
clustering now visible in American agriculture.We can now refer back to the introductory remarks concerning the
problems faced by American farmers in adjusting to their new status as
a minority group. This shift in status involves two major dimensions.
The most obvious one is the reduced ability to muster political strength
in legislative processes. This is well documented and will not be
explored further in this discussion. A second dimension is less well
understood but is perhaps more significant in the long run. At the
same time that farmers have been declining in absolute numbers and as
a percentage of theelectorate, an internal shift has taken place in
the power structure within agriculture. The political decline has been
associated with an economic concentration. From 1949 to 1969, farms with
gross receipts from farm sales of $20,000 and over increased their
share of total farm marketing from 31.5% to 73.5%. In that same time
period the index of prices received by farmers increased by approximately
10%. Even after correction for price level changes, the share of farm
marketing accounted for by farms with sales of over $20,000 in 1949
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prices had more than doubled in 20 years.-
An even more revealing indication of the degree of farm size
expansion is provided if we compare the economic size of farms required
to produce half of the total value of farm output in 1949 and 1969.
Slightly over 50% of total receipts from farm marketing were received
by farms with cash sales over $10,000 in 1949; by 1969 farms with
gross sales of $40,000 and over accounted for just under half of
total receipts from farm marketing. In 1972, farms with sales of over
$20,000 per farm were 24.4 percent of the number of farms and accounted
for 81.2% of the total cash receipts from farming. We can break this
upper farm size class down into two groups. Over the past ten years,
there has been virtually no change in the proportion of total cash
receipts received by farms with gross sales of $20,000 to $39,999.
They accounted for 19.7% of total cash receipts from farming in
~/ These data and the statistics that follows are from U. S. D. A.,
Agricultural Statistics, 1972, and earlier years; Farm Income
Situation, FIS-222, July 1973, pp. 69-71.
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1963 and 20.0% in 1972. All of the increase in the proportion of
receipts from farm marketing by farms with sales over $20,000 has
been accounted for by farms with gross sales of $40,000 and over.
In that same ten years they increased their share of total receipts
from farm marketing
~ese data make
is at the low end of
7/
from 40.2% in 1963 to 61.2% in 1972.-
it clear that the voting strength in agriculture
the income scale while the economic strength is at
the upper end. Although it is too soon to draw conclusions from
trends of only a decade, it isat least plausible to suggest that we
are witnessing the development of a dual economic structure in
American agriculture. This is comprised of a relatively numerous
sector of small to medium sized family farms, possessing some voting
strength but little economic muscle. This sector accounts for most of
the farm population but only a minor fraction of the total value of
farm output. The second sector is numerically small but economically
powerful, and thus unable to influence events through ordinary poli-
tical processes. Lacking votes and possessing economic power, it
finds it increasingly tempting to achieve its goals through the mani-
pulation of the power structure.
We have already seen the first clear cut evidence of the develop-
ment of this trend in the “chicken war” that broke out in the early
1960’s. This concerned a small number of large poultry producing firms
that saw a lucrative overseas market seriously threatened. They were
able to mobilize the weapons of economic warfare in the United States
out of all proportion to their numbers or their significance in total
economic activity. Additional evidence is provided by the recent
attempt of organized dairy farmersto use political campaign contri-
butions to influence milk price decisions. In a past generation,
the political influence
through the polls. It
of dairy farmers would have been exercised
seems plausible to expect that the next
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manifestation of this use of economic power
to resolve agricultural problems will occur
large scale beef feedlots are threatened by
production.
An opening theme of this paper can now
instead of voting strength
in the beef sector if
price collapses and surplus
be restated. To an impor-
tant degree, the critical resource in United States agriculture is no
longer land but minerals. We are today in a phasein the use of mineral
resources that invites comparison with hunting, gathering and fishing
stages of development, before the invention of agriculture.
With one great difference: In the hunting and gathering phase human
beings were securing a,food supply that was replenished primarily by the
direct use of solar energy, through chlorophyll photosynthesis. When
man accomplished the transition to agriculture he did so by a more
efficient method of ordering and organizing these solar energy processes.
The transition from manpower-agriculture to animal-power agriculture re-
presented a still more efficient organization of these same energy
sources .
The most recent transition from animal agriculture to mechanized
agriculture represents a major change in the mode of energy conversion.
Until well into the Twentieth Century almost all of our food supply came
from flow resources derived directly “from solar energy. Today a large
and rapidly increasing share of our food supply comes from stock resources,
primarily petroleum, coal and minerals. It is recognition that this
stock is limited that generates the acute environmental concern that
has exploded in the last decade.
But in what sense is it limited? The finite nature of the world’s
stock of resources can only be defined in terms of man’s knowledge of
how to use these resources. This knowledge gives them value, generates
prices, and creates a structure of prices that indicates relative values.
We have picked the “low-hanging fruit” first. We use the cheapest sources
of power, until they begin to rise in price. Then we set to work to
develop new ones.
Our experience with a heavy reliance on fossil fuels is encompassed
by the life-span of a man. It is not surprising that we should be having20
problems of accommodation, The wealth and abundance that has resulted
from our discovery of ways to use stock resources is in fundamental
conflict with the social systems and religious beliefs we have
inherited from our history of resource scarcity.
How can this accommodation be accomplished?
The simplistic solution is a “return to nature.” It is hard to
believe that sensitive, humane and intelligent people can find this
attractive, but some do. In its use of space, it is the ultimate form
of conspicuous consumption in our society. Quite simply, we do not
have land enough at a hoe-agriculture level of technology to support
more than a tiny fraction of the world’s population. Those who
seriously propose this solution are advocating a form of genocide.
A more realistic solution is composed of two parts:
1.) A search for greater economy in existing patterns of use of
stock resources. Here there is tremendous scope for improve-
ment, through waste recycling, mass transit, imp~oved space
heating anticooling, longer-lived products, and a list of econ-
omizing measures that is almost endless.
2.) A systematic shift to flow sources of solar energy. And this
has begun. Plant breeders are undertaking experiments to
improve the biological fixation of nitrogen. Forest products
are replacing steel, tin, and aluminum in packaging. But
much remains to be done. Greatly expanded research is needed
in solar space heating, greater use of winds and tides, multiple
cropping under environmentally controlled conditions, zoning
to promote land use in areas of maximum photosynthesis potential,
biological methods of pest and disease control, and many other
similar uses of flow and renewable resources.
A still bolder solution is to expand research into the possibilities
of “farming minerals.” We now stand at the threshold of the use of solar
energy and existing stock resources to reproduce and multiply sources of
energy that are substitutes for our present fossil fuels. This is the21.
promise of nuclear energy. There are enormous problems and great risks,
but this possibility is no longer in the realm of science fiction.
Agriculture in the United States has an enviable record of invention,
innovation, and adaptation. We have achieved a tremendous multiplier
effect from our investment in agricultural research and development. One
reason is that we have had many small firms with capacity to experiment
and adapt new technology,
If there are only big firms, this research and development spectrum
is broken. The main reason is that in hierarchical organizations decision
makers at the top are acutely afraid of failure. This holds.for firms
in private industry or agencies in government. To achieve rapid diffusion
of social change or new technology the cost of failure must be diffused.
This is the service performed by a mixed structure of small, medium and
large firms, or of local, state and federal units of government.
An alternative approach is to concentrate research and development
efforts in large agenices. This has been the approach taken in the Soviet
Union. Big increases in investment accelerate the output of new technology
but the technology is not applied, or is applied very sIowly. The multiplier
effect of centralized expenditures on research and development is reduced,
under hierarchical management systems.
A concentration of economic power in United States agriculture will
find its ultimate test in the capacity of the system to promote change.
The history of large scale firms is that they resist change. This is true
across cultural and national boundaries, and in private enterprise and
socialized economic systems. There is real danger that a reasoned exami-
nation of the present trend toward economic concentration will be rendered
impossible by those who identify opponents of bigness with sentimental
proponents of a return to the fsmily farm. To silence discussion at this
stage would be a monumental disservice to United States agriculture. It
is for this reason that we should be grateful to the University of Missouri
and to the Perry Foundation for this opportunity to meet and discuss these
vital issues.